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ABSTRACT 
 
LINDSAY KENNEDY: Looking at the Past with a Whole New Perspective: The Influence 
of Visual Perspective on Hindsight Bias 
(Under the direction of Lawrence J. Sanna) 
 
 Subjective experiences, namely feelings of ease or difficulty that accompany 
thinking, have been found to influence hindsight bias (e.g., Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 
2002). When thinking is easy, hindsight bias increases because people equate ease with 
plausibility; when thinking is difficult, however, hindsight bias is reduced. Recently, the 
influence of visual perspective (first- vs. third-person) on judgments has been explored (e.g., 
Libby, Eibach, & Gilovich, 2005), which may moderate the relationship between subjective 
experiences and hindsight bias.  In two studies, the hypothesis that people rely more on their 
subjective experiences when thinking from a first-person perspective than a third-person 
perspective was examined.  This follows from the suggestion that the third-person 
perspective promotes more abstract construal (Libby, et al., 2005), which may reduce 
reliance on subjective experiences. A marginally significant interaction was found between 
visual perspective and subjective experiences on judgments of inevitability. The implications 
of these studies are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Although I was once told that “hindsight is 50/50,” most of us are familiar with the 
more popular version of this expression, “hindsight is 20/20.”  Take this clichéd saying from 
everyday conversation into the laboratory, and we have what is known as the hindsight bias.  
Hindsight bias is a notably widespread phenomenon that occurs when “finding out that an 
outcome has occurred increases its perceived likelihood” (Fischhoff, 1975).  It can arise in a 
wide array of contexts, and is not easy to eliminate.  Even when participants are aware of and 
familiar with the existence of the hindsight bias, it seems that they are not immune to it 
(Bonds-Raacke, Fryer, Nicks, & Durr 2001). 
It has been suggested recently that three subcomponents of hindsight bias exist: 
perceptions of necessity, foreseeability impressions, and memory distortions (Blank & 
Nestler, 2006; Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008).  Though hindsight bias is still 
conceptualized as a single phenomenon, these subcomponents may act independently from 
one another (usually in differing magnitudes, and sometimes in differing directions; Blank, et 
al., 2008).  In this breakdown of the hindsight bias, perceptions of necessity refers to the 
degree to which one believes that the outcome of an event had to occur.  Foreseeability 
impressions refer to the general overestimation, after the fact, of the predictability of an event 
outcome.  Finally, memory distortions simply refer to inaccurate recall of outcome 
2 
 
predictions once the outcome is known.  These distortions typically place predictions more in 
line with the outcome than they really were. 
When such biases exist, psychologists naturally begin to look for causes and 
consequences of them.  In particular, several lines of research suggest that thinking of 
reasons to support alternative outcomes serves to attenuate hindsight bias (for reviews, see 
Fischhoff, 1982; Guilbault, Bryant, Posavac, & Brockway, 2004; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990).  
However, contrary to these suggestions,  more recent research  suggests that thinking about 
alternative outcomes may not always be effective at attenuating hindsight bias, and, in fact, 
may backfire by increasing it (for a review, see Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & Yoon, 2007).  
For example, in a meta-analysis of 95 studies on hindsight bias, it was concluded that 
manipulations focused on generating alternatives did not result in lower effect sizes, 
indicating hindsight bias remained (Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004).  More 
to the point, attempts to reduce hindsight bias by generating alternatives often backfire due to 
the subjective experiences that accompany exposure to outcome information.  Sanna and 
Schwarz (2007) noted that these subjective experiences can include the experience of ease or 
difficulty of thought generation or recall, feelings of fluency and familiarity, or experiences 
of surprise.  These subjective experiences are directly related to whether outcomes or 
alternative outcomes are seen as inevitable or not beyond what is concluded from the content 
of people’s thoughts. 
CHAPTER 2 
HINDSIGHT BIAS AND SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCES 
 
 Sanna, Schwarz, and Stocker (2002), for example, used a thought listing procedure to 
test whether levels of hindsight bias could be influenced by the generation of differing 
numbers of alternative outcomes.  In two studies, participants were given a scenario about a 
British-Gurkha war (adapted from Fischhoff, 1975).  Some participants were given no 
outcome information, whereas others were or told that either the British or the Gurkhas were 
victorious.  After receiving outcome information, participants were asked to list either 2 or 10 
thoughts about how the outcome may have turned out differently.  Listing 2 thoughts was 
found to be an easy task for participants, whereas listing 10 thoughts was found to be a 
difficult task for participants.  Following the thought listing task, judgments of outcome 
inevitability were made by all participants. 
 From this experimental design, Sanna et al. (2002) found that the subjective 
experience of ease or difficulty when generating thoughts  interacted with the number of 
thoughts (thought content) generated by participants.  In other words, those participants who 
were instructed to list 10 thoughts about how the outcome could have been different found 
this task difficult and therefore concluded that the alternative outcome was, in fact, unlikely, 
which resulted in greater hindsight bias.  This finding is in contrast to previous ideas that 
listing more thoughts about alternative outcomes should result in lesser hindsight bias.  
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Participants who listed 2 thoughts, however, found this task to be easy, thus making the 
alternative outcome seem more likely, and lowering hindsight bias. 
 These findings for generating alternatives and hindsight bias are consistent with those 
obtained in other areas.  For example, in a now classic study of these issues, Schwarz, Bless, 
Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, and Simons (1991) had participants list either 6 or 12 
examples of assertive or unassertive behavior.  Those participants who were asked to list 6 
examples of assertive behavior, experienced as easy, evaluated themselves as being more 
assertive overall than those participants asked to list 12 examples, experienced as difficult.  
Again, it was found that the subjective experience of ease or difficulty in generating such 
thoughts interacted with the content of people’s thoughts, even sometimes resulting in 
judgments that were opposite to the implications of thought content.   That is, people who 
found it easy to generate examples of (un)assertive behaviors judged themselves to be high 
on that characteristic, but those who found it difficult to generate examples of (un)assertive 
behaviors judged themselves to be low on that characteristic.  Other research further supports 
a default mind-set that “ease is good and difficulty is bad.”  For example, Briñol, Petty, and 
Tormala (2006) provide the example “if tennis is easy, I must be good at it.”  As applied to 
the present research, the subjective ease of generating thoughts about an event outcome 
equates to plausibility or likelihood.
CHAPTER 3 
VISUAL PERSPECTIVE MAY INFLUENCE HINDSIGHT BIAS 
 
If subjective experiences are a common factor in hindsight bias judgments, then 
manipulations that influence the extent to which these experiences are relied upon when 
making judgments may reveal the conditions under which hindsight bias is likely to be higher 
or lower.  My thesis was designed to examine one possible mechanism:  visual perspective.  
In other words, “putting things into perspective,” differing perspectives, that is, might show 
us when hindsight judgments are more influenced by thought content and when they are 
more influenced by subjective experiences. 
Psychological research on perspective comes from several areas.  For example, in a 
series of studies, Libby, Eibach, and Gilovich (2005), found that the influence of memory 
perspective influenced judgments of personal change.  Participants were asked to recall their 
first experience with psychological treatment.  To manipulate memory perspective, 
participants were either prompted to visualize the event from a first-person perspective or a 
third-person perspective.  Those visualizing the event from a first-person perspective were 
instructed to put themselves back in the memory, and look out at their environment through 
their own eyes, as the event happened originally.  Conversely, those visualizing the event 
from a third-person perspective were instructed to actually see themselves in their memory, 
as if looking at the event as an observer.  Following this manipulation, participants rated how 
much they had changed since their first psychological treatment.  It was found that those 
6 
 
participants who were induced to take a third-person perspective reported greater personal 
change over time than those who experienced their memory from the first-person 
perspective.  In another study, it was found that participants asked to recall past social 
awkwardness in high school from a third-person perspective not only reported greater 
personal change, but also proceeded to act more skilled in a social situation.  Taken together, 
the authors proposed that the third-person perspective leads to more abstract construal than 
the first-person perspective (Libby et al., 2005). 
Perspective taking has also been applied to some judgmental biases.  For example, 
research has suggested that people are “blind” to their own biases and even claim that they 
are more objective decision makers than are others (Pronin, Gilovich, & Ross 2004).  
Similarly, Heath (1999) found that when asked about job performance motivation, workers 
claimed that they were motivated intrinsically for the sake of self-betterment, while their co-
workers were driven by external, financial factors.  Taken together, such studies illustrate 
that differing perspectives—first- versus third-person—affect the judgments that people 
make.
CHAPTER 4 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
 
My thesis was designed to test whether people rely more on their subjective 
experiences when judging the past from a first-person visual perspective (the likely default 
perspective taken in prior research) but less on their subjective experiences when judging the 
past from a third-person perspective (a possibility not yet tested by prior research).  This idea 
follows from research examining the role of subjective experiences in self-other differences.  
That is, some recent research indicates that people will rely on their subjective experiences 
when making self-judgments but not when they are making judgments about others.  The 
essential idea here is that we are privy to our own subjective experiences and, so, by default, 
these experiences are likely to influence self-judgments; in contrast, subjective experiences 
are not generally used when making judgments about others because we are not privy to their 
subjective experiences (Caruso, 2008).  The result is that self judgments are influenced by 
subjective experiences, whereas judgments about others are influenced only by thought 
content.  
In the present research, I extend this idea by examining whether subjective 
experiences are used when making judgments from a first-person perspective, similar to self 
judgments, but that people may rely on thought content when making judgments from a 
third-person perspective, similar to judgments about others.  In essence, when people take a 
third-person perspective they act as if they are observers of their own behaviors (Libby et al., 
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2005).  Thus, my hypothesis is that when generating thoughts from a third-person, outside 
observer perspective, people may be less likely to use subjective experiences in judgments.  
In short, making judgments from a third-person perspective may be similar to making 
judgments about others, and people may rely on thought content rather than their subjective 
experiences under such conditions.  Perspective-taking could thus further inform when 
hindsight bias occurs, as well as suggest ways of influencing it by changing people’s visual 
perspective. 
To date, research involving the role of perspective on judgment and decision making 
has only tested whether judgments differ for self and others, and it has not tested whether 
differing visual perspectives have similar effects.  For example, Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 
(1994), in research on the planning fallacy, found that when “actors” generated thoughts 
about completing a task, they underestimated task completion times.  However, when 
different participants read these thoughts (the “observers”), they tended to overestimate task 
completion times.  In a similar manner, Wanke, Bless, and Biller (1996) found effects of 
subjective experiences (accessibility) when individuals were asked to generate 3 or 7 
arguments for or against an issue and then form an attitude on the issue, but content effects 
were found when participants were asked to simply read arguments generated by others.  
That is, generating arguments from the first-person perspective resulted in attitudes 
consistent with subjective experiences, but reading arguments generated by others resulted in 
attitudes consistent with thought content.  
Initial Research 
Sanna, Kennedy, and Chang (under review) provided indirect evidence for the 
possibility that hindsight bias may be influenced by people’s perspectives.  Hindsight bias 
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was investigated using the outcome of a basketball game between the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill (Carolina) and Duke University (Duke).  On the day before the game 
(Time 1), all participants were asked to predict the outcome of the game and rate the 
inevitability of such an outcome.  On the day following the game (Time 2), participants were 
asked to generate 3, 12, or no reasons as to why Carolina won the game before completing 
the same inevitability ratings as Time 1.  Finally, a week later (Time 3), participants who had 
previously listed reasons were given back their reasons, and asked to read over them before 
making the inevitability ratings.   
The main results pertinent to my thesis were as follows:   Hindsight judgments were 
influenced by subjective experiences when generating thoughts at Time 2, consistent with 
prior research, but hindsight judgments were consistent with thought content when 
participants simply read over the thoughts they had generated previously at Time 3.  This 
shift in levels of hindsight bias may have revealed a fading, or dissociation, of subjective 
experiences over time.  My thesis was designed to examine whether these effects may have 
resulted from a change in visual perspective when people look back at themselves after time 
has passed.  That is, participants may have naturally taken a first-person perspective at Time 
2 when generating reasons, and, as time passed, took a more third-person perspective at Time 
3 when reading reasons.  This is consistent with the idea that people may view themselves 
from a third-person perspective, as an observer might, when looking at their own past 
behaviors (Frank & Gilovich, 1989; Libby et al., 2005).  However, visual perspective was 
neither manipulated nor tested in the Sanna et al. (under review) research.
CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 1 
 
My first study provided an initial test of the hypothesis that visual perspective may 
interact with subjective experiences and influence hindsight judgments.  In this experiment, I 
attempted to induce either a first- or third-person perspective.  The design was a 2 (visual 
perspective: first-person vs. third-person) x 2 (event outcome valence: positive vs. negative) 
x 2 (reasons generated: 3 vs. 12) between-participants factorial.  I used a variation of the 
verbal perspective inductions employed by Libby et al. (2005) to manipulate how 
participants thought about a past academic event.  Also included was a reasons generation 
task that made it possible to evaluate the effects of subjective experiences versus thought 
content effects. 
An interaction between visual perspective and reasons generated was hypothesized, 
such that 1) the first-person perspective would produce hindsight judgments consistent with 
subjective experiences and 2) the third-person perspective would produce hindsight 
judgments consistent with thought content effects.  Finally, event valence was included in an 
attempt to address the possibility that positive and negative outcomes may produce different 
effects, given the likely high personal relevance of academic events to the undergraduate 
participants.  Although not explicitly hypothesized, Blank et al. (2008) suggested that 
personally relevant events are likely to result in a self-protective pattern of hindsight 
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judgments.  That is, a person is more likely to see a negative personally relevant outcome as 
more necessary (in a sense, denying personal control over the outcome), yet less foreseeable. 
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 113 undergraduates from the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course.  In exchange for their 
participation, participants received credit toward partial fulfillment of a class requirement. 
Procedures 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were told that the purpose of the 
experiment was to examine students’ reactions to various life events.  Sessions were 
conducted in a closed conference room, where there was no participant interaction.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions, ranging from first-person 
perspective/positive academic event/3 reasons generated to third-person perspective/negative 
academic event/12 reasons generated.  All data were collected via questionnaires that were 
administered during 30-minute lab sessions. 
Perspective manipulation and manipulation checks.  Perspective was manipulated 
through paragraphs that were modeled after Libby et al. (2005).  Participants in the first-
person condition read: 
Please recall a positive (successful) (negative/unsuccessful) academic event (such as 
getting a high (low) grade on an exam, quiz, assignment, speech, etc.) that you had 
about a month ago.  Please visualize yourself experiencing the positive (negative) 
academic event FROM THE SAME VISUAL PERSPECTIVE THAT YOU 
ORIGINALLY HAD; in other words, LOOKING OUT AT YOUR 
SURROUNDINGS THROUGH YOUR OWN EYES, as you were when the event 
was happening.  Please try to make your memory detailed as vivid as possible and 
keep it in your mind as you continue through the questionnaire. 
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Participants in the third-person condition read: 
Please recall a positive (successful) (negative/unsuccessful) academic event (such as 
getting a high (low) grade on an exam, quiz, assignment, speech, etc.) that you had 
about a month ago.  Please visualize yourself experiencing the positive (negative) 
academic event FROM AN OBSERVER’S VISUAL PERSPECTIVE; in other 
words, SO THAT YOU CAN SEE YOURSELF IN THE MEMORY, AS WELL AS 
YOUR SURROUNDINGS, as if you were in the room watching yourself.  Please try 
to make your memory detailed as vivid as possible and keep it in your mind as you 
continue through the questionnaire. 
 
After reading the respective paragraphs, participants were asked to make a drawing of the 
event, from the perspective they were visualizing.  In a box provided they then wrote about 
the event for approximately five minutes.  For our purposes, this not only served as a 
manipulation check, but also attempted to further induce perspective.  Additionally, on a set 
of rating scales, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they adopted a first-
person perspective, the extent to which they adopted a  third-person perspective, and the 
extent to which the event was positive and negative using 11-point rating scales ranging from 
0 (Not at all) to 10 (Very much). 
 Reasons generation.  Participants were asked to generate either 3 or 12 reasons why 
the academic event was positive/successful or negative/unsuccessful.  Corresponding 
numbered blanks were provided for participants to list their reasons.  Upon completion of 
reason generation, participants rated the extent to which generating the requested number of 
reasons was easy and the extent to which it was difficult.  Again, an 11-point scale was used, 
ranging from 0 (Not at all) to 10 (Very much). 
 Hindsight judgments.  On the last page of the questionnaire, hindsight judgments 
were obtained.  Rating scales asked participants to rate the extent to which the event outcome 
was:   1) inevitable, 2) foreseeable, 3) predictable, 4) anticipated, and 5) expected, each on 
11-point scales.  Finally, participants provided estimates of the probability of the positive or 
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negative academic event.  They were instructed to provide answers between 0% and 100% 
by inserting a number into a blank space.  These specific dependent measures were selected 
in an attempt to account for two of the ways in which hindsight bias may manifest itself: 
feelings of necessity (the extent that the event outcome was inevitable and the probability 
rating) and foreseeability impressions (the extent that the event outcome was foreseeable, 
predictable, anticipated, and expected; Blank & Nestler, 2006).  For the purposes of this 
study, memory distortions were not included. 
 Upon completing the experiment, participants were debriefed, provided with the 
opportunity to ask questions or express concerns, and thanked for their time. 
Results 
Perspective.  Participants were categorized into first- or third-person conditions based 
on their drawings of the event.  This was done because, although the instructions indicated 
what perspective each participant should adopt, it was sometimes the case that participants 
seemed (at least through their graphical representation) not to have followed, or possibly 
understood, instructions.  I thus report the hindsight judgments first by classifying 
participants to perspective on the basis of their drawings, but also report the results using 
perspective as participants were assigned to experimental condition.  Eight subjects failed to 
draw a picture from either perspective, and were dropped from subsequent analyses. 
In addition, the 11-point rating scale indicating the extent to which each participant 
adopted a third-person perspective was reversed-scored and averaged with the question 
assessing the extent to which each participant adopted a first-person perspective.  This 
produced a composite perspective score.  Numbers closer to 10 were indicative of a more 
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first-person perspective, while numbers closer to zero were indicative of a more third-person 
perspective. 
A 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant effect of 
perspective, F(1, 103) = 7.30, p = .008, such that those whose drawings demonstrated a first-
person perspective reported adopting a more first-person perspective.  As predicted, 
participants in the first-person perspective condition reported an average perspective of 7.30 
(SD = 1.60), and those coded as a third-person perspective reported an average perspective of 
6.19 (SD = 2.29).  This finding remains the same when the assigned perspective is used, as 
well, F(1, 103) = 22.854, p < .0001.  I note, however, that on average participants in both 
perspective conditions tended to report a more first-person mindset, as both means were 
above the midpoint of the scale, a point to which I will later return. 
Outcome Valence.  The extent to which the event was rated as negative was reversed-
scored and averaged with the extent to which the event was rated as positive.  As expected, 
participants thinking about a positively valenced event had, on average, more positive 
composite scores (M = 8.98, SD = 0.86) than those thinking about a negatively valenced 
event (M = 2.15, SD = 1.45).  This difference was significant, F(1, 103) = 893.08, p < .0001. 
Ease/Difficulty of Thought Generation.  The degree of thought generation difficulty 
was reversed-scored and averaged with the degree of thought generation ease.  As predicted, 
participants generating 3 reasons found the task relatively easy (M = 7.38, SD = 2.17), while 
those generating 12 thoughts found the task relatively difficult (M = 3.92, SD = 2.30).  This 
difference was significant, F(1, 103) = 670.17, p < .0001. 
Hindsight judgments.  Finally, a 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on all hindsight 
judgments, including the extent to which the outcome was seen as 1) inevitable, 2) 
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foreseeable, 3) predictable, 4) anticipated, and 5) expected.  Estimates of probability were 
also analyzed through the 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA.  Replicating Sanna et al. (2002), there was a 
significant main effect of thoughts generated on the average of all hindsight measures, such 
that generating 3 reasons led to more hindsight, overall, than generating 12 reasons, F(1, 96) 
= 6.03, p = .016. There was a marginally significant two-way interaction between reasons 
generated and perspective in drawing on the extent to which the outcome was inevitable, F(1, 
96) = 2.98, p = .087.  The means reported in Table 1 illustrate that this interaction was in line 
with the hypotheses.  Event valence did not qualify this interaction.  This interaction was not 
significant when the assigned perspective was used instead of the perspective drawn, F(1, 96) 
= .162, p = .689, and did not display a pattern in line with the hypotheses, as shown in Table 
2.  There were no other main or interactive effects for any of the other hindsight judgments 
(i.e., foreseeable, predictable, anticipated, and expected).  The probability measure, 0-100% 
rating, also did not differ by experimental conditions. All hindsight measures correlated 
significantly with one another, and produced a moderate reliability coefficient, α = .50. 
Discussion 
According to manipulation checks, perspective, valence, and ease of thought listing 
all seemed to be effectively manipulated.  However, there were no significant effects on 
hindsight bias measures (i.e., inevitable, foreseeable, predictable, anticipated, and expected).   
There was only the marginally significant interaction when participants were classified in 
perspective on the basis of their drawings.  Thus, I conducted a second study as an attempt to 
build on Study 1, but with a stronger manipulation of visual perspective.  In particular, after 
running Study 1, there seemed to be a couple of issues that I might improve upon.  First, 
there seemed to be some confusion on the part of participants when asked to adopt a 
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particular perspective.  That is, in several cases, participants were instructed to adopt one 
perspective, but they made a drawing of the opposite perspective.  Even though I classified 
them on the basis of their drawings, this confusion could have led to the manipulations being 
weaker than they could have been. Second, although the perspective manipulation check 
measure revealed a significant difference between first- and third-person perspectives, there 
was an overall trend towards first-person perspectives—that is, ratings were above the 
midpoint of the scale for both perspective conditions, indicating that participants did not take 
a strong third-person perspective.  Because of these possibilities, I conducted a second study 
that included a stronger method of perspective induction.
CHAPTER 6 
STUDY 2 
 
 Study 2 attempted to provide a stronger manipulation of visual perspective, and to 
provide generality to the findings of Study 1.  Here, instead of a verbal manipulation of 
perspective, I used a computerized video game, called Need For Speed II, Special Edition 
(NFSIISE) to induce either a first- or third-person perspective visually in participants.  
NFSIISE is a car-racing game that allows players to race while taking either a first- or third-
person perspective.  This was a more direct manipulation of perspective that did not rely on 
participants attempting to adopt a particular perspective on their own from verbal 
instructions.  For instance, such a manipulation does not require an understanding of the 
meaning behind first- and third-person perspectives, because participants actually assumed a 
first- or third-person perspective when they played the game.   
Study 2 was a 2 (perspective: first-person vs. third-person) x 2 (reasons generated: 3 
vs. 12) factorial, with a structure similar to that of Study 1.  As so, the hypotheses remained 
essentially the same.  That is, I predicted that the first-person perspective would produce 
inevitability ratings consistent with subjective experience, such that those participants 
generating 3 reasons would report greater hindsight judgments than those generating 12 
reasons, but that the third-person perspective would produce hindsight judgments that were 
consistent with content effects, such that those participants generating 3 reasons would report 
18 
 
lower hindsight ratings than those generating 12.  The factor of valence was excluded from 
this study, as it did not affect the results in Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 53 undergraduates from the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course.  In exchange for their 
participation, participants received credit toward partial fulfillment of a class requirement. 
Procedures 
The general procedures for this study conceptually replicated Study 1, with the main 
difference being the visual perspective manipulation.   There were up to five participants per 
session.  Upon arriving in the laboratory, participants were seated at a center table and told 
that the purpose of the experiment was to investigate how people make judgments about 
performances on various tasks.  They then had the opportunity to read and sign an informed 
consent form before being assigned to one of five individual rooms.   
 The computer game NFSIISE was used in this study.  This game lent itself well to the 
research due to its ease of play, non-violent nature, and ability to choose between points-of-
view, or perspectives (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 for screenshots from the game).  Once 
seated in front of the computer, participants were directed by the experimenter to read and 
follow the instruction sheet on their desks.   This sheet provided them with a short game 
description and directions (i.e., “Press the UP arrow to accelerate.”), instructed them to click 
“Continue” on the screen when they were ready to begin the race, and asked them to notify 
the experimenter once they had finished.  The computers were prepared in advance, such that 
each was randomly set to one of the two race perspectives before the participants arrived. 
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 Participants performed a two-lap timed trial, in which it was only their car on the 
track.  After finishing the race, approximately 2 minutes to 5 minutes later, participants 
notified the experimenter who recorded their total race time into a notebook.  This 
information automatically appeared on a screen that displayed a summary of their race 
statistics after they finished the race.  The experimenter then exited the game, and entered the 
participant’s total race time into the program.  The next screen instructed participants to, 
“Please wait while MediaLab calculates your percentile rank… ”  The experimenter then told 
participants that this screen may take up to a minute to calculate their performance in 
comparison to past participants, and that they should follow the directions on the next screen 
that appears.  The experimenter then left the participant’s room to allow for the completion of 
the questionnaire.   
After “calculating”, the next screen contained a fake (unbeknownst to participants) 
graph of the cumulative performance of past participants.  A portion of this graph was 
highlighted, indicating the performance of the current participant.  The text read, “Your total 
race time was in the 30th PERCENTILE.  In other words, your time was 10 seconds 
SLOWER than the average.  Please click “Continue” to proceed to the rest of the 
experiment.”  The “Continue” button was activated after a 15 second delay in an effort to 
ensure that participants had viewed their false feedback. 
  The questionnaire then began, and was similar to that used in Study 1, with a few 
modifications.  Participants were first asked to think back to when they were playing the 
game and visualize the race in their minds.    Participants were then asked to keep the 
visualization of the race in their minds as they continued through the rest of the experiment 
and list either 3 or 12 reasons as to why they performed in the 30th percentile.  Each reason 
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was to be typed into its own box, on its own page.  Participants were to hit “Enter” in order to 
move to a new screen to type the next reason.  Participants were asked to rate the ease and 
difficulty of listing the requested number of reasons on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (Not 
at all) to 10 (Very much), in order to verify the assumption that generating 3 reasons was 
considered easy, while generating 12 reasons was considered difficult.  All participants then 
answered questions aimed to assess their levels of hindsight bias, including ratings of 
inevitability, predictability, expectation, anticipation, unavoidability, and inescapability, all 
on 11-point scales.  Ratings of inevitability, unavoidability, and inescapability were intended 
to tap into necessity impressions, while the remaining ratings aimed to assess foreseeability 
impressions.  
After responding to all dependent measures, participants were asked a series of 
questions intended to assess the influence of the perspective manipulation and their 
subjective experiences on their responses.  The first question asked, “To what extent were 
you visualizing the race from a 1st or 3rd person perspective while generating reasons?”  
Participants were given a brief example of each type of perspective (e.g., “A 1st person 
perspective is as if you were sitting in the car, looking out through the windshield as a driver 
would.”) and then given an 11-point scale to indicate their perspective (anchored by 1st 
person and 3rd person).  They were then asked to think about the ease or difficulty 
experienced while generating reasons and indicate the extent to which those feelings 
influenced their judgments about the outcome (indicating their use of subjective experiences; 
again, on an 11-point scale). 
The final screen asked participants to inform the experimenter that they had 
completed the experiment.  Once all participants were finished, the experimenter thanked 
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them, gave them a paper copy of the debriefing, verbally explained the purpose of the 
experiment, and dismissed them. 
Results 
Perspective.  Analyses revealed a significant effect of manipulated perspective on the 
manipulation check of perspective, F(1, 49) = 19.93, p< .0001.  As predicted, participants 
who raced from a first-person perspective reported an average perspective of 5.00 (SD = 
3.894), and those who raced from a third-person perspective condition reported an average 
perspective of 9.27 (SD = 2.878), again with higher numbers reflecting a more third-person 
perspective. 
 Ease/Difficulty of Thought Generation. The degree of thought generation difficulty 
was reversed-scored and averaged with the degree of thought generation ease.  As predicted, 
participants generating 3 reasons found the task relatively easy (M = 7.34, SD = 2.64), while 
those generating 12 thoughts found the task relatively difficult (M = 4.48, SD = 1.95).  This 
difference was significant, F(1, 49) = 19.479, p< .0001. 
Hindsight judgments.  A 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on all measures of hindsight, 
including the extent to which the outcome was seen as 1) inevitable, 2) predictable, 3) 
expected, 4) anticipated, 5) unavoidable, and 6) inescapable.  As presented in Table 3, the 
predicted patterns of data between reasons generated and visual perspective was found on 
both the extent to which the outcome was viewed as anticipated and expected (perhaps both 
reflecting foreseeability impressions);  however, neither of these interactions were 
significant, F(1, 49) = .549, p = .462 and F(1, 49) = .162, p = .689, respectively.  No 
remaining interactions or main effects were significant, nor did the means reflect the 
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hypothesized patterns.  Again, correlations among all of the hindsight measures were 
significant, and produced a high reliability coefficient, α = .85. 
Use of Subjective Experiences.  Finally, there were no significant effects of visual 
perspective on whether subjects said they used their subjective experiences when making 
judgments, however, those in the first-person condition (M = 6.35, SD = 3.298) did reported 
using their subjective experiences slightly more than those in the third-person condition (M = 
6.11, SD = 2.833), F(1, 51) = .78, p = .782, which was in line with the hypotheses of the 
study. 
Discussion 
 As in Study 1, the independent variables in this study appeared to be effectively 
manipulated.  Although the NFSIISE game was a stronger manipulation of perspective 
because it did not simply rely on verbal instructions to induce participants to adopt a 
particular perspective, it may not have been strong enough.  Even though participants did 
report taking a more first-person perspective during thought generation if they raced from a 
first-person perspective and more of a third-person perspective during thought generation if 
they raced from a third-person perspective, this difference did not result in any significant 
main effects or interactions.  Also, although I was able to replicate the established finding 
that generating few thoughts is relatively easy, whereas generating many thoughts is 
relatively difficult, these subjective experiences were not found to interact with visual 
perspective as manipulated in this experiment. 
 For two of the hindsight bias measures, namely the extent to which the outcome was 
seen as anticipated and expected, there were trends in predicted directions.  With both of 
these variables, participants in the first-person perspective conditions appeared to rely on 
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their subjective experiences when making hindsight judgments (greater hindsight bias when 
asked to generate three thoughts, relative to 12), while participants in the third-person 
perspective conditions seemed to rely more on thought content (greater hindsight bias when 
asked to generate 12 thoughts, relative to 3).  However, these interactions did not reach 
significance. 
Also, different levels of reported use of subjective experiences were found between 
participants in the first- and third-person perspective conditions.  More specifically, 
participants in the first-person perspective condition reported using their subjective 
experiences (those of ease and/or difficulty) slightly more than participants in the third-
person perspective condition when making hindsight judgments.    But this difference was 
also nonsignificant. 
I note, however, the possibility that there remain some theoretically interesting 
possibilities.  For example, as proposed by Libby, et al. (2005), it could be the case that those 
adopting a third-person perspective subsequently adopted a more abstract level of construal, 
which, in this study, would suggest that this abstract level of construal may reduce the 
reliance on subjective experiences, possibly because they are simply unavailable.  In other 
words, the third-person perspective may serve to remove the individual from his or her 
subjective experience.  In line with Caruso (2008), it may be the case that participants 
adopting a third-person perspective feel more like an observer and less like themselves, 
which leads them to discount the usefulness of their subjective experiences.   But more 
research is needed to assess this possibility.  
There were also unanticipated findings.  To put things quite frankly, the hindsight 
bias measures displayed inconsistent patterns, and were mainly nonsignificant.  Although the 
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extent to which the event outcome was viewed as inevitable was marginally significant in the 
first study, the pattern revealed in the second study was in direct opposition to the hypothesis.  
This was the dependent measure that behaved most variably across studies.  The other 
dependent measures (i.e., the extent to which the event outcome was predicted, unavoidable, 
and inescapable) also displayed nonsignificant patterns, and thus did not support my 
hypotheses.
CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Across two studies, the effects of perspective-taking on levels of hindsight bias were 
examined.  It was hypothesized that participants taking a first-person visual perspective 
would rely on subjective experiences that accompanied their thought generation about an 
outcome when making hindsight judgments, thus demonstrating judgments consistent with 
thought accessibility effects.  In other words, participants listing 3 reasons were expected to 
show greater hindsight judgments than participants listing 12 reasons.  In contrast, for the 
third-person conditions, the opposite pattern was expected:  that is, participants listing 3 
reasons would have lower hindsight judgments than participants listing 12 reasons, consistent 
with thought content effects.  These hypotheses were based on the idea that subjective 
experiences are relied upon less when thinking about an event from a third-person 
perspective, an idea that had yet to be tested.   
In the first study, I attempted to manipulate perspective using a variation of the verbal 
perspective induction used by Libby, et al. (2005).  When recalling and generating 
explanations for a past academic performance from a first-person perspective, participants in 
Study 1 reported inevitability judgments consistent with their subjective experiences, 
whereas participants adopting a third-person perspective reported inevitability judgments 
consistent with thought content.  This interaction between perspective and thoughts listed 
was marginally significant. 
26 
 
Results from the second study were even more mixed.  The video game, Need for 
Speed II, Special Edition, was used to induce perspective as an alternative to the verbal 
perspective induction.  This methodological change was intended to provide a cleaner and 
stronger manipulation of perspective.  In this study, only a couple of nonsignificant patterns 
emerged in the direction of the hypothesis, with judgments of the degree to which the event 
outcome was anticipated and expected demonstrating the hypothesized interaction between 
perspective and thought generation.  But both of these patterns were nonsignificant.  Also, 
participants in the first-person perspective condition reported using their subjective 
experiences when making hindsight bias judgments more than participants in the third-person 
perspective condition, but this was only marginal.
CHAPTER 8 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Taken together, what inferences can be drawn from the current studies?  For starters, 
if the general hypotheses were, in fact, theoretically likely, it may be the case that the current 
perspective manipulation (NFSIISE) was too divergent from the perspective induction 
employed by Libby et al. (2005) to be effective.  Perhaps this manipulation was too subtle or 
its effects were too short-lived to produce significant differences in the hindsight judgments 
made by the participants.  To be even more direct, a future possibility may involve using 
video recordings to allow participants to actually observe themselves performing a behavior.   
Regarding the hindsight bias ratings, one glaring and unanticipated finding in these 
two studies was the way in which the dependent measures behaved, relative to one another.  
Although multiple dependent measures of hindsight were used, many were expected to 
provide similar results.  As it turns out, participants often reported divergent estimations of 
predictability, foreseeability, anticipation, and so forth, even though all of these measures 
were intended to assess hindsight bias.   
The question of whether the performance of these dependent measures was the 
product of a general misunderstanding of the measures or inappropriate conceptualizations of 
these terms cannot be answered with the existing data.  Blank and Nestler (2006) have 
provided empirical evidence to speak to the existence of the three subcomponents of 
hindsight bias, so perhaps it is more likely that the language of the dependent measures 
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created some confusion among the participants.  For example, although the use of synonyms 
such as unavoidable and inescapable was intended to provide multiple measures of the same 
concept, participants may have taken the different questions as an indication that they should 
be giving different answers.  That is, participants may have assumed that unavoidable and 
inescapable, for example, meant two different things in this context; otherwise, why would 
two separate questions be used?  Perhaps it would have been more efficient to “disguise” the 
similarity among the dependent measures by wording the questions differently.  For example, 
instead of asking the extent to which the event outcome was viewed as inevitable, etc., it may 
have been better to ask for levels of agreement with statements such as, “Nothing could have 
influenced the outcome of this [event]” (Blank & Nestler, 2006). 
It is also curious that the dependent measures performed so differently from the first 
study to the second study.  In the first study, the extent to which the event outcome was 
viewed as inevitable was the only measure to display a trend towards the hypothesized 
interaction.  In the second study, however, this measure produced a nonsignificant pattern in 
the opposite direction.  What would cause such discrepant findings from one study to the 
next?  As the study procedures were conceptually identical, the main substantial difference 
and potential explanation appears to be the perspective manipulation used.  On the other 
hand, it may be that the differing focal events (an academic event vs. a computerized racing 
game) resulted in somewhat different manifestations of the hindsight bias.  Because an 
academic event is likely to be more self-relevant for these participants (college 
undergraduates) than a video racing game, it is possible that the participants’ ratings of 
necessity and foreseeability impressions were more ego-defensive in the first study (Blank, et 
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al., 2008).  But, as event outcome valence did not qualify the hypothesized interaction 
present in the first study, there remains no clear answer to these inconsistencies. 
In order to move forward in this line of research, it appears that I may first need to 
take a step back.  Perhaps a better understanding of appropriate ways to induce different 
perspectives is required before we can develop a better understanding of the effects of 
perspective-taking on other concepts, such as the hindsight bias.  However, these 
manipulations clearly seemed to produce strong effects in prior research (e.g., Libby et al., 
2005; Libby, Shaeffer, Eibach, & Slemmer, 2007; Vasquez & Buehler, 2008), and my 
research followed these procedures quite closely.  As it stands now, it is unclear whether the 
null results from Study 1 and Study 2 are reflective of theoretical or methodological issues.  
A practical endeavor may involve attempts to replicate the basic design followed by Libby et 
al. (2005) using variations of the perspective induction.  Such research would help identify 
potential alternatives to the verbal induction and speak to the generalizability of the effects of 
perspective-taking.  If the reliability of additional inductions can be established, the influence 
of perspective-taking may then be applied to a wider range of theoretical questions.  Perhaps 
it is premature to conclude that perspective has no influence on subjective experiences, and 
thus, no influence on hindsight bias, but the results of the current studies aren’t enough on 
their own to make a case for the hypothesized effects.  It seems that more basic research on 
perspective-taking and perspective-taking inductions is needed before such a manipulation is 
included in more complex experimental designs. 
Following this, it would then be appropriate to test for differences in reported reliance on 
subjective experiences when making judgments as a result of perspective-taking.  If future 
studies can confidently demonstrate the overall hypothesis that was explored in the current 
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studies, attention may then turn to that of improving decision-making procedures.  If reliance 
on subjective experiences is viewed as heuristic-like or even flawed thinking, the case may 
be made that relying on thought content is more objective.  In turn, this may result in the 
recommendation to “take a step back” and “put things into (third-person) perspective” before 
making a judgment.  Similar logic could hold for reliance on thought content (length is 
strength; more is better) and the third-person perspective, but directed research may 
eventually be able to tease out the most effective perspective-taking strategy when making 
decisions.   Sometimes it may be most useful to figure out what doesn’t work, in order to 
better understand that which does work, and this may very well be one of those cases.  These 
could then have further implications for debiasing judgments.  Overall, although the current 
studies lacked significant results, perspective remains an interesting and potentially important 
concept within psychology.  As demonstrated by Libby, et al. (2007), adopting different 
perspectives can not only affect subsequent attitudes, but also self-ratings and subsequent 
behavior.  Visualizing oneself performing a behavior from the third-person perspective 
increases the likelihood that one will incorporate that behavior into their existing self-concept 
and increases the likelihood that the given behavior will be performed (Libby et al., 2007). 
Such findings make it clear that perspective-taking is meaningful and deserving of more 
research attention, as perspective-taking may carry great recommendations on how to 
increase desirable behaviors and decrease undesirable ones.  Again, although subjective 
experiences were not found to interact with perspective in these studies, it’s not to say that 
other psychological variables should not be explored in relation to perspective-taking.  In 
fact, it seems likely to me that perspective could be found to interact with several variables 
on outcomes such as emotions, perceptions of control, attributions, and even race relations.  
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Future researchers should not shy away from the study of perspective, but rather view it as a 
challenging puzzle to solve. 
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Table 1. Mean Inevitability Ratings using Perspective in Drawing, Study 1 
  Perspective in Drawing 
Reasons 
generated First-person Third-person 
3 4.43 (SD = 1.66) 3.58 (SD = 2.31) 
12 4.26 (SD = 2.38) 4.88 (SD = 2.33) 
Note. F(1, 96) = 2.98, p = .087. Maximum rating = 10. 
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Table 2. Mean Inevitability Ratings using Assigned Perspective, Study 1 
  Assigned Perspective 
Reasons 
generated First-person Third-person 
3 4.21 (SD = 2.13) 3.58 (SD = 2.04) 
12 4.77 (SD = 2.47) 4.54 (SD = 2.25) 
Note. F(1, 96) = .162, p = .689. Maximum rating = 10. 
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Table 3. Mean Hindsight Judgment Ratings (Anticipated, Expected), Study 2 
  Perspective 
Reasons 
generated First-person Third-person 
Anticipated 
3 6.08 (SD = 2.19) 6.00 (SD = 2.42) 
12 5.79 (SD = 2.72) 6.64 (SD = 2.10) 
Expected 
3 6.42 (SD = 2.58) 6.23 (SD = 2.32) 
12 6.14 (SD = 2.80) 6.50 (SD = 2.18) 
Note. Anticipated: F(1, 49) = .549, p = .462; Expected: F(1, 49) = .162, p = .689. Maximum 
rating = 10. 
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Figure 1. A third-person perspective screenshot from NFSIISE.   
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Figure 2. Race summary screen that is displayed after the race. 
 
 
 
